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PAGE 01 BELGRA 05318 01 OF 03 051729Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 DHA-02 SSO-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1892
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BELGRADE 5318

FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/SOV
FROM USDEL CSCE

USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: CSCE
SUBJ: BELGRADE CSCE: WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS, JULY 31 - AUGUST 5

REF: BELGRADE 5172

SUMMARY: PREPARATORY MEETING CONCLUDED WORK AUGUST 5 BY
ADOPTING DOCUMENT CONTAINING DECISIONS AND BINDING
INTERPRETIVE CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENTS ON DATE, DURATION,
AGENDA, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL MODALITIES OF MAIN
MEETING. FINAL BREAKTHROUGH WAS ACHIEVED AUGUST 3 WHEN
SOVIETS, AFTER TWO HARD DAYS OF BARGAINING IN AN INFORMAL CON-
TACT GROUP AND A BILATERAL DINNER WITH USDEL, AGREED TO IMPROVE-
MENTS ON DURATION ISSUES WHICH MET ESSENTIAL NEEDS OF
WESTERN DELS. MAIN MEETING WILL OPEN OCTOBER 4 WITH TARGET

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PAGE 02 BELGRA 05318 01 OF 03 051729Z

CLOSING DATE OF DECEMBER 22, POSSIBILITY OF EXTENSION INTO
MID-FEBRUARY 1978 IF NECESSARY, COMMITMENT TO CONTINUE
WORK UNTIL A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AND DATE AND PLACE FOR
SUBSEQUENT BELGRADE-TYPE MEETING HAS BEEN AGREED, AND
WITH AN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE THAT WE CONSIDER WILL
ALLOW US TO OBTAIN OUR PRIMARY GOAL--A THOROUGH
REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION--AS WELL AS REASONABLE OPPOR-

TUNITY TO NEGOTIATE LIMITED NUMBER OF CONSTRUCTIVE NEW
PORPOSALS. END SUMMARY.

1. NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED AUGUST 3 IN SMALL, INFORMAL
CONTACT GROUP INITIATED BY USDEL AND COMPOSED OF
DELS WHICH HAD INDICATED PROBLEMS WITH ACCEPTING SPANISH
PACKAGE COMPROMISE PROPOSAL PREVIOUS WEEK. CONTACT
GROUP GENERALLY FOUND U.S., U.K., FRANCE, PORTUGAL,
NETHERLANDS, AND ROMANIA RANGED ON ONE SIDE AGAINST
SOVIETS AND GDR IN EFFORT TO OBTAIN MORE FLEXIBILITY
ON TWO DURATION ISSUES: HOW LONG WORKING BODIES COULD
OPERATE AND WHAT CONDITIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE MET BEFORE
MAIN MEETING ITSELF COULD CLOSE. NEUTRAL AND NON-
ALIGNED (NNA) AND NUMBER OF NATO DELS WHICH HAD INDICATED
THEY COULD RELUCTANTLY ACCEPT SPANISH PAPER REMAINED
ON SIDE LINES WISHING WESTERN DELS WELL IN THEIR EFFORT
TO OBTAIN IMPROVEMENTS, BUT NERVOUS THAT, IF DEADLOCK
WERE MAINTAINED THROUGH END OF WEEK, MEETING MIGHT
HAVE TO ADJOURN UNTIL MID-SEPTEMBER WITH ADVERSE
IMPLICATIONS FOR, AS THEY SAW IT, NOT ONLY CONVENING OF
MAIN MEETING BUT DETENTE IN GENERAL.

2. SOVIETS HUNG TOUGH THROUGH EVENING OF
AUGUST 2 WHEN, AT A U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL DINNER, USDEL
GAVE THEM A "NON-PAPER" CONTAINING MINIMUM CHANGES
DESIRED BY WESTERN DELS TO KEY POINT 13 OF SPANISH
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PAGE 03 BELGRA 05318 01 OF 03 051729Z

PROPOSAL. IN SUDDEN REVERSAL, SOVIET REP SURPRISED
PLENARY THE FOLLOWING MORNING BY PROPOSING THAT
SPANISH POINT 13 BE ACCEPTED WITHOUT CHANGE BUT THAT
A THREE-POINT CHAIRMEN'S STATEMENT BE AGREED GIVING AN

AGREED INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT. THIS CHAIRMAN'S
STATEMENT CONSISTED OF (A) COMMITMENT THAT, IF DRAFTING
WORK REMAINED WHEN SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODIES ENDED,
PLENARY WOULD, IN EFFECT, REESTABLISH THEM AS "DRAFTING
GROUPS" TO COMPLETE DRAFTING WORK; (B) FURTHER CLARI-
FICATION THAT DESPITE SEEMING FIRM CUT-OFF DATE FOR
MAIN MEETING OF MID-FEBRUARY, MAIN MEETING WOULD HAVE
TO ADOPT ITS CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AND SET DATE AND PLACE
OF SUBSEQUENT BELGRADE-TYPE FOLLOW-UP MEETING "BEFORE"
IT ENDED; AND (C) REAFFIRMATION OF PRINCIPLE THAT ALL
DECISIONS MUST BE TAKEN BY CONSENSUS, A POINT SPECIFICALLY
DESIRED BY US AND UK DELS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT MEETING
WOULD CLOSE ONLY WITH CONSENT OF ALL 35 PARTICIPANTS.

3. WESTERN AND ROMANIAN DELS ACCEPTED SOVIET COM-
PROMISE OFFER AFTER EC-9 AND NATO CAUCUSES AND FURTHER
INFORMAL PLENARY AFTERNOON OF AUGUST 3 MADE NUMBER OF

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PAGE 01 BELGRA 05318 02 OF 03 051750Z
ACTION EUR-12

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 BELGRADE 5318

DRAFTING EMENDATIONS AND MOST IMPORTANTLY AGREED THAT ALL CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENTS (SEVERAL OTHER IMPORTANT ONES HAD BEEN AGREED ON ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS DURING PREVIOUS WEEK) WOULD HAVE SAME BINDING POLITICAL VALUE AS MAIN DOCUMENT, WOULD BE ADOPTED FORMALLY BY CONSENSUS AT FINAL AUGUST 5 PLENARY THAT ADOPTED BASIC DOCUMENT, AND THAT EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT WOULD PRINT BASIC DOCUMENT AND CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENTS TOGETHER IN SINGLE BOOKLET CONTAINING RESULTS OF PREPARATORY MEETING.

4. A FURTHER SOVIET CONCESSION PAVED WAY FOR AGREEMENT ON FINAL PROBLEM, STARTING DATE FOR MAIN MEETING. POINT 13 HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED ON BASIS OF A SEPTEMBER 27 STARTING DATE, AND DECEMBER 9 CLOSE FOR SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODIES (11TH WEEK), AND DECEMBER 16 TARGET DATE FOR CLOSE OF MAIN MEETING (TWELFTH WEEK). NUMBER MY DELS, HOWEVER, HAD PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES WITH STARTING MAIN MEETING IN SEPTEMBER, AND SOVIETS HAD INSISTED THAT, REGARDLESS OF WHEN MEETING STARTED,
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 BELGRA 05318 02 OF 03 051750Z

WORKING BODIES SHOULD END DECEMBER 9, AND TARGET DATE SHOULD BE DECEMBER 16. SOVIET AGREEMENT TO PUSH LATTER DATES BACK TO DECEMBER 16 AND DECEMBER 22, RESPECTIVELY, PERMITTED DECISION TO OPEN MAIN MEETING OCTOBER 4. SOVIETS, WORKING THROUGH ROMANIAN AND POLISH DELS, MADE LAST-MINUTE EFFORT ON AUGUST 4 TO INTRODUCE "POLITICAL CONCEPT" LANGUAGE INTO BASIC DOCUMENT OR COMMUNIQUE. A FEW WESTERN DELS, LED BY USDEL, FIRMLY TURNED THIS ASIDE BY NOTING THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT TIME TO ENGAGE IN LENGTHY DRAFTING EXERCISE THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO AGREE ON HOW TO CHARACTERIZE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH MAIN MEETING SHOULD BE CONDUCTED.

5. WE BELIEVE THAT BASIC U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR PREPARATORY MEETING HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, IN PARTICULAR, AGENDA AND ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT SHOULD PERMIT US TO ENGAGE IN A THOROUGH REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF FINAL ACT OVER PAST TWO YEARS. IT SHOULD ALSO BE POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE A LIMITED NUMBER OF NEW PROPOSALS, PROVIDED THOSE NEW PROPOSALS ARE SUFFICIENTLY MODEST IN SCOPE THAT THEY CAN ACHIEVE CONSENSUS WITHIN A TIMEFRAME OF A FEW MONTHS. FINALLY, PREPARATORY MEETING HAS, IN EFFECT, TAKEN A SUBSTANTIVE DECISION THAT CSCE PROCESS WILL NOT END AT BELGRADE, BECAUSE OF MANDATE FOR MAIN MEETING TO SET DATE AND PLACE FOR ANOTHER SIMILAR FOLLOW-UP MEETING.

6. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR MAIN MEETING ACCOMPLISHES THE OBJECTIVE IN THE NATO PROPOSAL INTRODUCED BY US AND UK AT BEGINNING OF PREPARATORY MEETING, THOUGH IN A NUMBER OF INSTANCES THERE WAS NEED TO TRADE ORIGINAL TACTICAL METHOD FOR AN ALTERNATE THAT PROMISES CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 BELGRA 05318 02 OF 03 051750Z

TO OBTAIN SAME END RESULT BY SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT ROUTE. FOR EXAMPLE, WE ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED THAT EMPHASIS ON THOROUGH REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED BY HAVING A THREE-WEEK CLOSED PLENARY (WEEKS 2-4) DEVOTED ENTIRELY TO IMPLEMENTATION FOLLOWED BY ONLY FIVE WEEKS OF COMMITTEES THAT WOULD DEAL WITH BOTH IMPLEMENTATION AND NEW PROPOSALS. THIS WAS CONVERTED INTO A PACKAGE WHICH INCLUDES ONE WEEK OF CLOSED PLENARY DEBATE ON BOTH IMPLEMENTATION AND NEW PROPOSALS FOLLOWED BY NINE WEEKS OF COMMITTEE WORK ON BOTH IMPLEMENTATION AND NEW PROPOSALS PLUS PROMISE OF FURTHER TIME, IF NECESSARY, FOR DRAFTING CONCLUSIONS IN WHAT WOULD AMOUNT TO COMMITTEES AS WELL AS IN PLENARY. OUR ORIGINAL TACTIC TO AVOID A POSSIBLE

SOVIET FILIBUSTER--A TWELVE-WEEK TARGET DATE WITH AN UNAMBIGUOUS OPEN-ENDED CONTINUATION, IF NECESSARY--HAS BEEN CONVERTED INTO RELIANCE UPON A COMBINATION OF SUBSTANTIALLY MORE TIME FOR DETAILED COMMITTEE WORK THAN WE HAD ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED PLUS SOVIET COMMITMENTS THAT WORK CAN EXTEND INTO MID-FEBRUARY, IF NECESSARY, AND THAT MEETING CANNOT CLOSE UNTIL A CONSENSUS HAS BEEN REACHED ON A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE RETAINED IMPORTANT CONCEPT OF OPENING AND CLOSING PLENARIES, OPEN TO PUBLIC, WHICH WE CAN USE TO MAKE MAJOR UNILATERAL STATEMENTS GIVING OUR INTERPRETATION OF WHAT BELGRADE SHOULD DO AND WHAT IT WILL HAVE MEANT.

7. A WORD OF CAUTION WOULD BE IN ORDER FOR ANY EFFORT TO DRAW LESSONS FOR THE MAIN MEETING FROM THE WAY IN WHICH THE PREPARATORY MEETING HAS EVOLVED. THE LATTER HAS BEEN TECHNICAL, THOUGH SUBSTANCE WAS ALWAYS JUST BELOW THE SURFACE. THE MAIN MEETING, HOWEVER, WILL BE RELATIVELY UNCHARTED WATERS. WE DO THINK, HOWEVER, THAT A FEW CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM THE BEHAVIOR OF DELS OVER THE PAST SEVEN AND A HALF WEEKS.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 04 BELGRA 05318 02 OF 03 051750Z

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 BELGRA 05318 03 OF 03 051833Z

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INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 DHA-02 SSO-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 BELGRADE 5318

8. THE SOVIETS SHOW EVERY EVIDENCE OF BEING ON THE DEFENSIVE. THEY ARE LESS INTERESTED IN OBTAINING MAJOR RESULTS FROM BELGRADE THAN IN GETTING THROUGH IT AS QUICKLY AND PAINLESSLY AS POSSIBLE. THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THEIR FREQUENT PRIVATE COMMENTS TO USDEL THAT THEIR INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO PRESENT A MIRROR IMAGE TO US: TO ATTACK IF WE ATTACKED; TO BE MILD IF WE WERE MILD. THEY ALMOST INVARIABLY TOOK FLOOR IN PLENARY WHENEVER USDEL SPOKE, AND THEY REACTED WITH COUNTER-PROPOSALS WHENEVER WESTERN DELS TOOK INITIATIVES. THEY SHOWED, HOWEVER, THAT THEY CAN AND WILL OPERATE SKILLFULLY AND FORCEFULLY FROM THEIR POSITION OF THE TACTICAL DEFENSIVE. THEY COMBINED, BOTH IN PLENARY AND IN INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH, PARTICULARLY, THE SMALLER DELS, OCCASIONAL THREATS AND INTIMATIONS OF FORTHCOMINGNESS, PROVIDED THAT THEY WERE NOT PUSHED INTO A CORNER. IN ADDITION, THEY TRIED HARD TO PLAY ON FEARS OF WESTERN EUROPEANS THAT U.S. WOULD TAKE AN AGGRESSIVE STANCE, IN AN ATTEMPT TO SPLIT US FROM OUR ALLIES AND

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 BELGRA 05318 03 OF 03 051833Z

NEUTRAL FRIENDS.

9. THE NATO ALLIANCE OPERATED MUCH AS IT HAS THROUGHOUT THE CSCE EXERCISE. AN OCCASIONALLY AGGRAVATING TENDENCY TO FRAGMENT AND PURSUE INDEPENDENT COURSES WAS COMBINED WITH FIRMNESS ON FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES. SOME OF THE ALLIES SHOWED A NERVOUSNESS OVER U.S. INTENTIONS WHICH WILL PROBABLY REAPPEAR AT THE MAIN MEETING, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE SENSITIVE HUMAN RIGHTS AND BASKET THREE ISSUES COME UP, AND A RESULTING WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT LESS THAN HALF A LOAF RATHER THAN PROBE THE MARGINS OF SOVIET TOLERANCE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE FINAL COMPROMISES THIS WEEK DEMONSTRATED ONCE AGAIN THAT STRONG U.S. LEADERSHIP IS WELCOMED AND THAT THE ALLIES WILL SUPPORT US IN THE CRUNCH PROVIDED WE HAVE CHOSEN GROUND THAT IS, IN THEIR VIEW, NOT TOO EXTREME.

10. THE DETERMINED NNA EFFORT TO FORMULATE AND ADVOCATE COMMON POSITIONS WAS A MAJOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE PREPARATORY MEETING. THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOVIETS AND THEIR REACTIVE POLICY MADE IT DIFFICULT TO HAVE PROPOSALS CLEARLY BEARING A WESTERN STAMP NEGOTIATED SERIOUSLY# AT SEVERAL CRUCIAL STAGES, THEREFORE, NNA PACKAGE

PROPOSALS, PORTRAYED AS COMPROMISES BUT IN FACT REFLECTING FAR MORE WESTERN THAN EASTERN CONTENT, GAVE THE MEETING A VITAL STIMULUS. UNTIL THE FINAL WEEK WHEN SEVERAL TACTICAL MISJUDGMENTS BY THE NNA TOOK THEM OUT OF THE PICTURE AND LEFT IT TO EAST AND WEST TO WORK OUT THE FINAL COMPROMISE, THE NNA "BLOC" PLAYED A ROLE VERY CLOSE TO THAT OF AN ARBITER. SINCE NNA GENERALLY SHARE WESTERN VIEWS AND ACTING TOGETHER MAY BE ABLE TO TONE DOWN MORE EXTREME IDEAS OF SOME OF THEIR MEMBERS, NOTABLY MALTA, CONTINUA-
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PAGE 03 BELGRA 05318 03 OF 03 051833Z

TION OF THIS TREND IN THE FALL WOULD LARGELY BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE. NNA INTEND TO MAKE THE EFFORT. IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT IN FALL, HOWEVER, SINCE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS HAVE DIFFERENT PRIORITIES ON SUBSTANTIVE AS OPPOSED TO PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS. WE UNDERSTAND, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT A RECENT MEETING OF EXPERTS IN BELGRADE TO ATTEMPT COORDINATION OF CBM POLICY DID NOT GET MUCH FURTHER THAN AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.

11. ROMANIAN DEL GAVE EVERY INDICATION THAT IT IS AS DETERMINED AS EVER TO MAINTAIN ITS MAVERICK ROLE IN WARSAW PACT CAMP, AND SPANISH MADE A BIGGER CSCE IMPRESSION THAN EVER BEFORE. LATTER DEVELOPMENT IS, IN PART, ATTRIBUTABLE TO IMPRESSIVE PERSONAL QUALITIES OF SPANISH REP AND, IN PART, TO INTENTION OF POST-FRANCO SPAIN TO ASSUME NEW EUROPEAN ROLE. SPANISH PERFORMANCE IN MAIN MEETING MAY ALSO BE INFLUENCED BY MADRID'S INTEREST IN HOSTING NEXT FOLLOW-UP MEETING, A DESIRE WHICH CAN PROBABLY ONLY BE SATISFIED IF SPANISH PERFORMANCE DOES NOT UPSET ANY OTHER PARTICIPANT.

12. ONE OTHER FACTOR, THE PRESS, SHOULD BE MENTIONED. AS EXPECTED, PRESS SHOWED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN PREPARATORY MEETING. IT CAME IN LARGE NUMBERS AT BEGINNING IN EXPECTATION OF A FIGHT. FINDING NONE, IT LARGELY ABANDONED MEETING UNTIL END OF JULY WHEN MANY JOURNALISTS RETURNED TO DETERMINE WHO WON AND WHO LOST. WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DISCOURGAE SPORTING METAPHORS, TAKING LINE THAT PREPARATORY MEETING HAS LAID BASIS FOR WORKMAN-LIKE, SERIOUS MEETING WHERE WE WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY BOTH TO REVIEW IMPLEMENTATION RECORD AND MAINTAIN CSCE PROCESS BUT THAT THERE WAS NEITHER VICTOR NOR VANQUISHED IN PREPARATORY MEETING, AND THERE IS NOT LIKELY TO BE IN THE FALL EITHER.

13. USDEL WILL CLOSE SHOP TEMPORARILY AUGUST 6.
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PAGE 04 BELGRA 05318 03 OF 03 051833Z

THIS WILL THEREFORE BE LAST WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS CABLE
UNTIL MAIN MEETING OPENS IN OCTOBER.
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